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BEYOND TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL
CHILLING EFFECT ON THE INTERNET OF
BROAD LAW ENFORCEMENT
LEGISLATION
TODD M. GARDELLAt
INTRODUCTION
Terrorists manipulate themselves to society's center stage by
exploiting the omnipresence of the media within the modern
information age. It is generally understood that, for so much as
the cause of modern international terrorism seems to cast itself
as diametrically opposed to western values and modernity, its
proponents are unafraid to utilize the Internet to further their
goals of disruption and destruction. In many ways, the
information age is the great enabler of terrorism, providing not
only the channels for terrorists to communicate amongst
themselves throughout the globe, but also providing them the
opportunity to amplify their voice, spread their message, and
permeate the homes of those plugged into the modern world of
interconnectivity.
Both the ubiquity of the Internet and its connection with
terrorism distinguish the new millennial era from previous eras
of war or crises. The United States' war on terrorism comprises a
global effort; terrorism's war on the United States pervades the
consciousness of the interconnected multitudes in an effort to
shatter our political will.1 In many ways, the decentralized,
networked, and amorphous characteristics of the Internet
resemble those of the modern terrorist infrastructure. The same
properties that make the Internet such a powerful conduit for
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1997,
Hofstra University.
1 See Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After
September 11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 185 (2002) ("The very point of terrorism, the brand of warfare
we face now as a nation, is to shatter our political will.").
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progress, free expression, and the unhindered exchange of ideas
also make it an ideal haven from where those who wish to
perpetuate terror can strike. So far as the Internet is concerned,
this is the conundrum faced by lawmakers as they seek to
confront terror. The policies formed from the rapid enactment of
antiterrorism legislation will likely have an adverse effect on the
online environment that has burgeoned in the absence of
regulation. The difficulty lies in discerning where to draw the
line between legislation that may provide only ancillary benefits
to antiterrorism efforts while burdening civil liberties, and
legislation that may thwart terrorism and justify the sacrifice of
certain freedoms.
It is easy to take for granted the ability to speak freely. It
may seem quaint to talk of the need to protect some of these
fundamental liberties amidst the images of terror on the evening
news and throughout the Internet. But now is precisely the time
to evaluate the freedoms that recent generations have been able
to take for granted. The protections afforded by the First
Amendment to each citizen of this country appear more fragile
and certainly less quaint when one considers that most countries
afford no such protections, and in fact may be retreating from
any protection that may have existed. 2
The freedom versus security grapple has enveloped public
debate since the establishment of the United States. 3 It is
impossible, however, to undertake this familiar debate without
examining First Amendment freedoms against the modern
backdrop of the information age. Unfortunately, there are no
robust principles that comport with an era so dependent upon the
First Amendment. 4 Similarly, there is no analogue in history to
the modern threat of global terrorism that plagues the
information society. It is therefore conceivable that existing First
Amendment jurisprudence may not provide the appropriate
framework to properly evaluate the degree to which the Internet
may withstand the erosion of certain civil liberties.
2 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Russian TVNewsman Fired in Media Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A10 (citing an example of Russian President Vladimir
Putin's tightening of control over the news media).
3 Recall Benjamin Franklin's famous warning: "Those who would give up
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor
Safety." Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act, H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. § 2(1) (2003).
4 See discussion infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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With the prevalence of the Internet, the considerations
attendant to its existence and role within society become an
integral component to the freedom-security dialectic. Of specific
interest within the scope of this Note is whether we should allow
for broader exceptions to First Amendment protections to afford
us a method by which to combat terrorism. While acknowledging
the validity of both the distress over free speech abridgment and
the desire to ensure the safety of our nation and its citizens, this
Note seeks to explore whether cyberspace requires analysis
distinct from that which applies to the traditional free speech
areas. To this end, Part I of this Note addresses the enactment of
those antiterrorism laws which potentially burden free speech
and the debate over whether those laws should be truncated or
expanded. Part II sketches the twentieth century evolution of
First Amendment jurisprudence and the application of free
speech principles to the Internet. The analysis in Part III
defends the quick action taken by Congress to grant authority in
an emergency situation, but qualifies that defense by reinforcing
the need for deliberation. The analysis then shifts to pinpointing
those considerations for deliberation unique to the Internet and
seeks to identify some of the dangers of broadening authority
beyond the scope immediately necessary to confront the modern
threat of terrorism.
I. FREE SPEECH CONCERNS ARISING FROM THE PATRIOT ACT AND
OTHER ANTITERRORISM LAWS
A. The Civil Liberties Abridgment Inherent in Antiterrorism
Legislation
Congress passed the Patriot Act into law on October 29,
2001. 5 The enactment of such a sweeping bill just over a month
after the worst terrorist act this nation had ever suffered
suggests a lack of deliberation. 6  This urgency reflected the
desperation the citizens of this country felt as a whole. But the
5 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT') Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See generally Robert O'Harrow Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at W6 (describing the passage of the Patriot Act).
6 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that
numerous discrepancies within Section 505 of the Patriot Act may evidence poor or
hasty congressional drafting).
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Patriot Act was not the first piece of legislation to address
terrorism.7 Nor was it the first to be challenged as violative of
First Amendment rights.8 The Patriot Act, however, expanded
much of the prior legislation. 9 As its formal name-Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act-suggests, the Patriot
Act packaged numerous amendments that altered many of the
previous laws to provide for greater law enforcement
capabilities. 10  As such, it remains the culmination of the
antiterrorism effort. In fact, the name "Patriot Act" carries with
it the connotation of all antiterrorism activity, and is both a rally
point for supporters and a target for critics."
1. Material Support
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") of 1996 provided the ability to target Foreign
Terrorist Organizations ("FTOs") by criminalizing activities that
support such organizations. 12 The procedures established by the
AEDPA authorize the government to designate certain groups as
FTOs 13 and make it a crime to provide "material support" to any
7 See, e.g., Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240,
2250-52 (extending United States criminal jurisdiction to include terrorist acts).
Chapter 113B under Title 18 of the United States Code houses legislation enacted
over the past fifteen years to address the terrorism threat to our nation. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2331-2339B (2000).
8 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D. Cal.
1998), affld, 205 F.3d 1130 (2000) (challenging the classification of the Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as foreign terrorist
organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
9 See, e.g., infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act § 805 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A to broaden
the jurisdiction of federal courts in terrorism support cases); id. § 806 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) to expand the scope of assets subject to forfeiture).
11 See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L.
REV. 663, 663-64 (2004) (attaching the label of "anti-antiterrorism movement" to the
aggregate of those voices which are critical of the antiterrorism effort).
The thesis of the [anti-antiterrorism] movement, which has some of the
appearances of a political campaign, is that steps being taken domestically
to combat the potential for terrorist attacks are too intrusive and a threat
to cherished civil liberties.
The principal focus of the campaign is the USA PATRIOT Act ....
Id. at 663.
12 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
13 Id. § 219 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189). This section authorizes the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, to
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of these designated FTOs. 14 A year after the enactment of the
AEDPA, the Secretary of State designated thirty organizations as
FTOs. 15 Not long after that, several humanitarian groups and
citizens brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
provisions. 16 These groups had sought to provide support to the
nonviolent humanitarian and political activities of several of the
designated FTOs, but abstained from providing any such support
for fear of criminal prosecution. 17 The plaintiffs argued that such
a prohibition on support infringed their associational rights
under the First Amendment.18 The plaintiffs also challenged the
Secretary of State's "unfettered and unreviewable authority to
designate" FTOs, and alleged that the AEDPA is
unconstitutionally vague. 19  While rejecting the first two
arguments, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
terms "training" and "personnel"-two of the enumerated
activities constituting material support-were unconstitutionally
vague. 20
The Patriot Act expanded the material support section of the
designate an organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization if 1) the organization
is a foreign organization, 2) it engages in terrorist activity, and 3) such activity
threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. See id.
14 Id. § 303 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). Section 303 stated the unlawful act
as follows: 'Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Id. The phrase "material
support or resources" is defined as "currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious
materials." Id. § 323. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)).
15 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650,
52,650-51 (Oct. 8, 1997).
16 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (C.D. Cal.
1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1130 (2000).
17 Id. at 1180.
is Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1133. The right to associate
falls within First Amendment jurisprudence and is thus generally protected in the
absence of specific intent to commit unlawful acts. See NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929-31 (1982) (holding that for association to be
grounds for liability, it is necessary to establish that a party authorize or ratify
unlawful acts of the person or group with whom the party is associated).
19 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1133.
20 See id. at 1137-38.
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AEDPA. 21 One of the more controversial provisions within the
Patriot Act, Section 805, amended the material support section to
include "expert advice or assistance" among the enumerated
banned activities. 22 The material support provision has become
the workhorse statute for terrorism prosecutions. 23  Not
surprisingly, it has become a frequent target of constitutional
challenges. 24  These challenges arise both as a defense in
criminal cases 25 and through preemptive challenges, as in the
injunction sought by the Humanitarian Law Project. 26
Generally, courts have upheld the section against First
Amendment challenges, 27 but some courts have held select
portions to be impermissibly vague. 28 Notably, however, courts
21 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(expanding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 303).
22 Id. The full definition of material support can be found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(1):
[T]he term "material support or resources" means any property, tangible or
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel..., and transportation, except medicine or religious
materials.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 defined "expert advice or assistance" as "advice or assistance
derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge." Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 6603, 118 Stat.
3762-64 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3)).
23 See Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecuting Terrorists, 26 NAT'L L.J. 12 (2004)
(reporting that dozens of people, including "some of the highest profile defendants,"
are being prosecuted under the statute); see also David Cole, The New McCarthyism:
Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003)
(describing the targeting of material support to terrorist organizations as "the
linchpin of the government's current war on terrorism"). "Virtually every criminal
'terrorism' case that the government has filed since September 11 has included a
charge that the defendant provided material support to a terrorist organization." Id.
at 9.
24 See supra note 16; infra notes 25-26.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Al-Arian ("Al-Arian f"), 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1333-
34 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
26 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
27 See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1244-45
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135-37 (9th
Cir. 2000); Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1343; United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp.
2d 348, 361-62, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541,
568-74 (E.D. Va. 2002).
2s See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1137-38 (holding that the
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have tended to deny recognizing the more classic First
Amendment challenges of overbreadth 29  and associational
violations.30
2. Definition of Domestic Terrorism
In close relation to the issues surrounding the material
support provision is the apprehension regarding Congress's
inclusion of a definition for "domestic terrorism" within the
Patriot Act. 31 Civil liberties groups claim that this section could
be misused to attack legitimate political advocacy groups. 32 The
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") expressly opposed this
terms "training" and "personnel" are unconstitutionally vague); Humanitarian Law
Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (expanding its
catalog of unconstitutionally vague material support provisions to include the phrase
"expert advice or assistance"); Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 356-61 (dismissing the
counts of the indictment based on the vagueness of the terms "communications
equipment" and "personnel"). But see Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74 (finding the
phrases "personnel" and "services" not to be vague and expressly disagreeing with
the Humanitarian Law Project cases).
29 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1201-02
(denying the plaintiffs claim that the phrase "expert advice and assistance" is
substantially overbroad). "[Tlhere comes a point at which the chilling effect of an
overbroad law, significant though it may be, cannot justify prohibiting all
enforcement of that law-particularly a law that reflects legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct." Id. at 1201 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). The court
stated that the Supreme Court required that application to protected speech of the
law in question be substantial, "not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the
scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications before applying the 'strong
medicine' of the overbreadth invalidation." Id. (quoting Hicks, 539 U.S. at 120).
30 See, e.g., Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 368. For an example of punishment for
associational activity, see infra note 101 (discussing Senator McCarthy's campaign
to punish Communist association).
31 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); 18
U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2004). Section 802 amended the definitions for terrorism under 18
U.S.C § 2331 to include domestic terrorism. Id. The amendment defines domestic
terrorism as activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
32 See American Civil Liberties Union, How the USA-Patriot Act Would Convert
Dissent into Broadly Defined "Terrorism," (Oct. 23, 2001) (unpublished).
20061
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
new definition of domestic terrorism, claiming that it can be used
to prosecute dissidents and those who may provide assistance as
minimal as lodging.33 Others have expressed concern that the
new definition of domestic terrorism could theoretically include
violations of state or federal law as wide ranging as getting into a
bar fight or reckless driving.34 The Justice Department, however,
has defended the defined crime of domestic terrorism against
these allegations, claiming that peaceful political organizations
involved in political advocacy would not fall within the scope of
the definition.3 5
3. Enhanced Surveillance Procedures
Title II of the Patriot Act contains a series of provisions that
enhance the surveillance power of the government.3 6 Section 201
grants the government authority to intercept wire, oral, and
electronic communications where there has been evidence of
material support to terrorism.3 7  Section 202 grants such
authority in instances involving computer fraud and abuse.38
Section 209 allows for the seizure of voice mail messages.3 9
Section 214 deals with pen register 40 and trap and trace41
33 See id.
The ACLU does not oppose the criminal prosecution of people who commit
acts of civil disobedience if those acts result in property damage or place
people in danger. That type of behavior is already illegal and perpetrators
of these crimes can be prosecuted and subjected to serious penalties.
However, such crimes often are not "terrorism." The legislative response to
terrorism should not turn ordinary citizens into terrorists.
Id.
34 Anita Ramasastry, Patriot II: The Sequel Why It's Even Scarier than the First
Patriot Act, FINDLAW, Feb. 17, 2003, http://writ.findlaw.com/ramasastry/
20030217.html (expressing concern that such a broad classification standard would
subject individuals to civil liberties infringements such as extensive surveillance).
35 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Dispelling the Myths, http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/
subs/u.myths.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (supporting "peaceful political
discourse and dissent" as among "America's most cherished freedoms").
36 See USA PATRIOT Act § 201.
37 Id. § 201.
38 Id. § 202. Section 202, entitled "Authority to Intercept Wire, Oral, and
Electronic Communications Relating to Computer Fraud and Abuse Offenses,"
purports no relationship to terrorism. Id. Instead, it expands the government's
surveillance ability where there has been a violation of § 1030 of the United States
Code, the statute dealing with computer fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2004).
39 USA PATRIOT Act § 209. This section essentially extended the ability to
seize email to the ability to seize voicemail as well, replacing throughout 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 the word "electronic" with "wire or electronic." Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2004).
40 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) contains the following definition of "pen register":
[Vol. 80:655
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authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA").42
These surveillance sections were enacted as "sunset"
provisions, set to expire after four years. 43 Considering that
these sections deal directly with communications and
information technology, the potential exists for such intrusion to
chill communications. 44 The choice to include a sunset provision
seemingly demonstrates Congress's trepidation over these
sections. Of particular concern is the absence of any reference to
terrorism in Section 202, 45 and that the authority granted under
Section 201 is triggered by the much-questioned material support
section.46
4. Access to Records
Akin to the surveillance ability granted by the Patriot Act to
the government is the expansion of the ability to access records
previously established by FISA.47 Section 215 has received much
press for its grant of authority allowing the access of library
records. 48 In addition to privacy issues, there is also concern that
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing,
or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication, but such term does not include any device or process used
by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for
billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services
provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or
customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like
purposes in the ordinary course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2004).
41 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) contains the following definition of "trap and trace
device":
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the
source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2004).
42 USA PATRIOT Act § 214. This section amended sections 402 and 403 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978. Id.
43 See id. § 224.
44 See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (describing the chilling effect).
45 See USA PATRIOT Act § 202.
46 See id. § 201.
47 See id. § 215 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
48 See id.
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this provision will result in a chilling effect upon people's reading
habits.49 Within the context of the Internet, online vendors have
claimed this provision has had an adverse impact on e-commerce,
with the thrust of the dissension coming from online
booksellers. 50 Although the government has provided limited
information to the public regarding its use of this section, 51 the
Justice Department disclaims any charges of abuse and suggests
that concerns over library surveillance are overblown. 52 As with
the surveillance provisions, this section was enacted as a sunset
provision, scheduled to expire after four years. 53
5. National Security Letters
In Section 505 of the Patriot Act, Congress expanded the
authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to issue
national security letters ("NSLs") that compel communications
firms-such as Internet service providers ("ISPs") or telephone
companies-to produce certain customer records whenever the
FBI certifies that those records are "relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities."54 The statute limits access to
those investigations "not conducted solely on the basis of
activities protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment," 55 but it also
includes a non-disclosure provision, which has generated
concern. Thus, while the examination of records in general may
49 See Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA Patriot Act's Application to Library
Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 288-92 (2003).
50 See Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; The Patriot Act Has Led Online
Buyers and Sellers To Watch What They Do. Could it Threaten Internet Business?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at C6 (reporting the perceived chilling effect Section 215
has had over online booksellers and their customers).
51 See ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(ordering the government to release some of its records relating to its activity
pursuant to section 215, but acknowledging that some records were properly
withheld under Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")). "Since its
implementation, the government has provided limited information to the public
regarding its use of section 215." Id. at 26.
52 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 35. The Justice Department has
repeatedly claimed that the government has no interest in the reading habits of
citizens. Id.
53 See USA PATRIOT Act § 224.
54 USA PATRIOT Act § 505(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709). "The FBI's
demands under § 2709 are issued in the form of national security letters ("NSLs")."
Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
55 USA PATRIOT Act § 505(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709).
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provoke apprehension over infringement on civil liberties and the
potential for a derivative chilling effect, the inclusion of a non-
disclosure provision raises a pure First Amendment issue.5 6
In Doe v. Ashcroft, the New York District Court enjoined
both the issuance of NSLs and the enforcement of the non-
disclosure provision, finding that the former violated the Fourth
Amendment and that the latter violated the First Amendment.57
The court hypothesized, based on numerous drafting
discrepancies, that the legislation may have been hastily
drafted.5 Acknowledging that several bills pending in Congress
would clarify these discrepancies, 59 the court stated that it would,
regardless of such clarifying amendments, find that the statute
exerts a coercive effect on NSL recipients. 60 The court also found
that the non-disclosure provision allowing perpetual secrecy was
too broad and open-ended and thus constituted both a prior
restraint on speech and a content-based restriction. 61
B. Varied Responses to the Patriot Act
Congressional unity in the weeks after the terrorists
attacked on September 11 has fractured; so has much of the
public opinion regarding the Patriot Act and its effects-and
potential effects-upon the civil liberties of citizens. 62 In a free
society, total security is a utopian concept, as perfect security
would essentially entail the end of liberty.63 The debate thus
56 See Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475 ("[N]ational security letters
('NSLs') ... constitute a unique form of administrative subpoena cloaked in secrecy
and pertaining to national security issues. The statute bars all NSL recipients from
ever disclosing that the FBI has issued an NSL.").
57 Id. at 526-27.
58 See id. at 491 ("Are the various differences between § 2709 and other
analogous statutes, extensive as the discrepancies are, simply the product of poor or
hasty congressional drafting?").
59 See Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Tools Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 3179,
108th Cong. (2003); Antiterrorism Tools Enhancement Act of 2003, H.R. 3037, 108th
Cong. (2003); Judicially Enforceable Terrorism Subpoenas Act of 2004, S. 2555,
108th Cong. (2004).
60 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
61 Id. at 511-12. "Without detailing the degree of narrow tailoring which the
First Amendment demands with respect to § 2709, the [clourt concludes that § 2709
is not sufficiently narrow." Id. at 514.
62 Compare supra Part I.B.1 (describing the movement to narrow the Patriot
Act) with supra Part I.B.2 (describing support for expanding law enforcement
authority).
63 See Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act, H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. § 2(1)
(2003).
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demands focus on the practical questions of which liberties may
be compromised and to what extent they should be compromised.
Lawmakers continue to deliberate these questions.
1. The Movement to Narrow the Patriot Act
Deeply troubled by the lack of debate and suspension of the
normal review process that accompanied the enactment of the
Patriot Act, civil liberties groups have urged Congress to exercise
its plenary powers to hold oversight hearings and require
ongoing reports regarding the implementations by law
enforcement of the powers granted to it by the Act. 64  The
addition of a sunset clause evidences Congressional distress over
the abridgment of normal legislative process. 65 Pursuant to these
concerns, the House Committee on the Judiciary began
conducting oversight of the Department of Justice's
implementations of the Patriot Act within a year of the act's
passage into law.66
Some lawmakers have taken the floor to speak out against
the overbreadth of the Patriot Act, 67 while others have introduced
bills for narrowing the scope of certain provisions of the Act.68
The 210 to 210 deadlock vote in the House in July, 2004, on a
proposal that would have barred the federal government from
demanding library and other records, exemplifies the
64 See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., USAPA SUNSET PROVISIONS COULD LEAVE
CONGRESS IN THE DARK, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/
20011212 eft usapa.sunset-analysis.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
65 See id.; USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
66 See Letter from Representatives F. James Sensenbrenner and John Conyers,
Chairman and Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to Honorable John
D. Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (June 13, 2002). In conducting such oversight,
Representatives F. James Sensenbrenner and John Conyers, chairman and ranking
member of the House Committee on the Judiciary respectively, addressed this letter
to Attorney General John Ashcroft on July 13, 2002 asking the Attorney General to
answer fifty questions regarding the implementations of the Patriot Act. Id.
67 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. E2283 (2001) (statement of Rep. Woolsey). 'The Bill
of Rights, civil rights and civil liberties must not be the 'other victim' of terrorism."
Id. In explaining his vote against the Patriot Act, Representative Woolsey compared
the Attorney General's tactics pursuant to the Patriot Act to the "preventive"
intelligence campaign of J. Edgar Hoover. Id. Representative Woolsey recalled how
Hoover's "Red Squads" abused liberties and were seldom effective. Id.
68 See, e.g., Security and Freedom Ensured ("SAFE") Act of 2003, S. 1709, 108th
Cong. (2003) ('To amend the USA PATRIOT ACT to place reasonable limitations on
the use of surveillance and the issuance of search warrants, and for other
purposes.").
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divisiveness amongst lawmakers. 69 This was just one of several
proposals introduced in either house of Congress to reform the
Patriot Act. 70 Among the reform bills that have been introduced
in the Senate are the Citizens' Protection in Federal Databases
Act,71 the Library and Bookseller Protection Act,72 the Protecting
the Rights of Individuals Act, 73 the Domestic Surveillance
Oversight Act of 2003, 74 the Library, Bookseller, and Personal
Records Privacy Act, 75 and the Security and Freedom Ensured
("SAFE") Act of 2003.76 Several bills were introduced into the
House as well: the Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act,77 the
Freedom to Read Protection Act of 2003,78 and the Surveillance
Oversight and Disclosure Act of 2003. 79 Capitol Hill, however,
has not been the only forum for challenging those sections within
69 See Eric Lichtblau, Effort to Curb Scope of Antiterrorism Law Falls Short,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A16. A last minute Republican rally brought the vote to
the tie, which by House rules rendered the amendment defeated. Id.
70 The Electronic Frontier Foundation hosts a webpage that keeps tabs on
Patriot Act-related bills. Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/patriot/
bills.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
71 S. 1484, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To require a report on Federal Government use
of commercial and other databases for national security, intelligence, and law
enforcement purposes, and for other purposes.").
72 S. 1158, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To exempt bookstores and libraries from orders
requiring the production of tangible things for foreign intelligence investigations,
and to exempt libraries from counterintelligence access to certain records, ensuring
that libraries and bookstores are subjected to the regular system of court-ordered
warrants.").
73 S. 1552, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend title 18, United States Code, and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to strengthen protections of civil
liberties in the exercise of the foreign intelligence surveillance authorities under
Federal law, and for other purposes.").
74 S. 436, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 to improve the administration and oversight of foreign intelligence
surveillance, and for other purposes.").
75 S. 1507, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To protect privacy by limiting the access of the
Government to library, bookseller, and other personal records for foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes.").
76 S. 1709, 108th Cong. (2003); see supra note 68 (quoting synopsis).
77 H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To provide for an appropriate review of
recently enacted legislation relating to terrorism to assure that powers granted in it
do not inappropriately undermine civil liberties.").
78 H.R. 1157, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to exempt bookstores and libraries from orders requiring the
production of any tangible things for certain foreign intelligence investigations, and
for other purposes.").
79 H.R. 2429, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 to improve the administration and oversight of foreign
intelligence surveillance, and for other purposes.").
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the Patriot Act that affect civil liberties. Throughout the nation,
more than 350 communities have passed resolutions criticizing
sections of the Patriot Act and calling for the vigilant protection
of civil liberties.80 Scrutiny on all levels of government should
focus much needed attention on those provisions posing the
greatest risk to liberty.
2. Support for Expanded Law Enforcement Authority
Much positive support for the antiterrorism laws also exists,
especially within the law enforcement community.81 On July 13,
2004, the United States Department of Justice released a report
extolling the success it has experienced due to the increased
power it derives from the Patriot Act.8 2 The report was issued as
part of a Bush administration campaign to discourage Congress
from weakening the law.8 3
In early 2003, the Justice Department drafted a legislative
proposal entitled the Domestic Security Enhancement Act.8 4
Perhaps the greatest insight into the Justice Department's
campaign for increased authority, the proposal-nicknamed
"Patriot II" or "Son of Patriot"-reached the public via leak, not
80 The ACLU hosts a webpage tracking those communities that have passed
resolutions opposing sections of the Patriot Act. American Civil Liberties Union,
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11294&c=207 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2006).
81 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT
AT WORK 5 (2004), http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/docs/071304_report-from_the
_field.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD] (asserting
that greater coordination between law enforcement and intelligence officers "made
possible by the... PATRIOT Act... have yielded extraordinary dividends by
enabling the [Justice] Department to open numerous criminal investigations,
disrupt terrorist plots, bring numerous criminal charges, and convict numerous
individuals in terrorism cases"). See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice,
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) (expressing strong support
for Patriot Act).
82 "As of May 5, 2004, the Department has charged 310 defendants with
criminal offenses as a result of terrorism investigations since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and 179 of those defendants have already been convicted." U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD, supra note 81, at 1.
83 Ashcroft Details Uses of Patriot Act, CNN.COM, July 13, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/13/patriot.act/index.html.
84 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2003
(2003), http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf [hereinafter SECURITY ACT];
Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at
38 ("New legislative proposals by the Justice Department now seek to take the
Patriot Act's antiterror powers several steps further, including the right to strip
terror suspects of their U.S. citizenship.").
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official release.85 Congress played little or no role in its drafting,
which has raised separation of powers concerns, in addition to
the more common apprehensions regarding liberty.8 6 In citing
the Justice Department proposal by name within a bill designed
to reassess recently enacted terrorism legislation, members of
Congress have opposed the proposal's sweeping grants of
authority that "are not related to terrorism, and would severely
dilute and undermine many basic constitutional rights as well as
disturb our unique system of checks and balances."87  The
proposal seems to make clear that the Justice Department will
not only continue its lobbying against the sunset provisions and
repeal of existing laws, but will actively seek to expand its power.
The Department's 120-page document makes the following
proposals: to enhance the government's ability to collect data on
citizens, such as increased access to consumer credit reports;88 to
more liberally collect genetic information;8 9 to increase the
surveillance power of the government; 90 to provide immunity
85 See Ramasastry, supra note 34.
86 See Declan McCullagh, Perspective: Ashcroft's Worrisome Spy Plans, CNET
NEWS.cOM, Feb. 10, 2003, http://ecoustics-cnet.com.com/2010-1071_3-983921.html
(" '[The proposal] transfers enormous power from the Congress and the judiciary to
the executive branch and gives the attorney general absolutely unprecedented
authority.'" (quoting Mark Rotenberg)); see also Benjamin Franklin True Patriot
Act, H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. § 2(4) (2003) ("Future legislation ... such as... the
Domestic Security Enhancement Act... contains a multitude of new and sweeping
law enforcement and intelligence gathering powers ... [that threaten to] severely
dilute and undermine many basic constitutional rights as well as disturb our unique
system of checks and balances .....
87 See H.R. 3171 § 2(4).
88 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, § 311(a) (providing for greater access by
law enforcement to consumer reports and information); see also Ramasastry, supra
note 34 (noting inclusion of portions of Admiral Poindexter's controversial Total
Information Awareness ('TIA") program within Justice Department draft). As an
initiative that would allow the government to compile data profiles of all Americans,
the TIA program generated a wide backlash. See id. ("Congress recently warned
against using TIA as a tool against US citizens. Nevertheless, Patriot II, as draft
[sic] by the Attorney General and his staff, would begin to make TIA the law.").
89 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, §§ 302(a)(1)(A), 303(a)(2), 303(a)(1)
(allowing executive officials to collect DNA samples, fingerprints, and other
identification information from suspected terrorists in custody, to receive such
information from state, local, and foreign governments, and to establish
identification databases). Critics of this proposal cite the government's allegedly
broad definition of domestic terrorism, see supra note 31, as a potential catalyst for
governmental abuse in collecting DNA and attempting to establish a database of
genetic information. See Ramasastry, supra note 34.
90 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, § 101 of Section-By-Section Analysis ("This
provision would expand [the statutory] definition of 'foreign power' to include all
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from liability to law enforcement, businesses, and others who
provide terrorist tips;91 to criminalize the use of encryption in
furtherance of a federal felony; 92 to broaden the government's
ability to keep information from the public;93 and to deport and
denaturalize American citizens.94 Notably absent, however, from
the Justice Department's proposals is a sunset provision.95 Also,
while the original Patriot Act purported to supply tools with
which to combat terrorism, 96 the Justice Department's proposal
persons, regardless of whether they are affiliated with an international terrorist
group, who engage in international terrorism.") (emphasis in original). Critics
charge that since the Justice Department's proposals eliminate the distinction
between domestic and international terrorism the government's definition of
domestic terrorism could lead to the conveyance of the looser standards that apply to
foreign intelligence gathering to the domain of domestic criminal acts. See
Ramasastry, supra note 34.
91 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, § 313 ("[A] commercial or business entity,
and any employee.., of such... entity, shall not be subject to civil liability in any
court for the voluntary provision or disclosure of information ... based on a
reasonable belief that ... [it] may assist in the investigation or prevention of
terrorist activities .... ). Of course, some concerns exist regarding the degree to
which we want to encourage members of society to spy on each other. See
Ramasastry, supra note 34 (comparing the potential effects of the Justice
Department's proposals to those of Operation TIPS, a contentious program "which
would have enlisted government employees to spy on citizens").
92 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, § 404 ("Any person who, during the
commission of a felony under Federal law, knowingly and willfully encrypts any
incriminating communication or information relating to that felony.., shall be
imprisoned .. "); see also Ramasastry, supra note 34 (noting that this new crime,
which is the first attempt to regulate encryption technology domestically, is not
limited to terrorism). Conceivably, peer-to-peer file swappers who use encryption
may automatically face years in prison if convicted for doing so while violating the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Id.
93 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, §§ 201 ("Prohibition of Disclosure of
Terrorism Investigation Detainee Information"), 203 ("Information Relating to
Capitol Buildings"), 204 ("Ex Parte Authorizations Under Classified Information
Procedures Act"); see also Ramasastry, supra note 34 (listing non-disclosure
enhancements for witnesses, grand juries, and detentions, and explaining the
weakening of FOIA).
94 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84, § 501 ("[J]ust as an American can
relinquish his citizenship by serving in a hostile foreign army, so can he relinquish
his citizenship by serving in a hostile terrorist organization.") This applies to those
who provide material support to a "group that the United States has designated as a
'terrorist organization,' if that group is engaged in hostilities against the United
States." Id.
95 See Ramasastry, supra note 34.
96 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) ("An
Act [t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world.").
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for a Domestic Security Enhancement Act transcends any specific
goal regarding terrorism. 97
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. A Brief History of Free Speech Protections
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 98 The Supreme Court did not commence
substantial interpretation of the First Amendment until early in
the twentieth century when Congress passed a pair of acts to
suppress assertedly subversive speech around the time of the
First World War.99 This does not mean, however, that the
government had not attempted to suppress political speech prior
to World War 1.100 In fact, history has shown that during war
and comparable times of crises, protecting civil liberties has often
taken a back seat to combating or coping with the exigencies at
hand. 101 The ebb of civil liberties during such trying times,
97 See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying notes
168-69. For example, the proposed crime against using encryption to commit
another crime mentions nothing of terrorism. Instead, the crime could be any federal
crime, however trivial. See supra note 92.
98 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 984
(15th ed. 2004). Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, Act of June 15, 1917, ch.
30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217-19, and the following year passed the Sedition Act of
1918, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553-54, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1921,
ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359-60.
100 See Act of July 14, 1798, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat. 596-97 (criminalizing
"any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of
the United States ... with intent to defame ... or to bring [the government or its
high officials] into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them.., the hatred of
the good people of the United States ...."). This law, commonly known as the
Sedition Act, was passed to insulate from criticism the administration of President
John Adams. See Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 668. During the Civil War, President
Lincoln suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Id. The conviction of a rebellious
citizen by military tribunal rather than civilian court evidences Lincoln's fear that
pro-South sedition would spread the Southern cause throughout the Northern
states. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (overruling the conviction of a citizen
by military tribunal rather than by civilian court).
101 See Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 667-71 (citing historical examples from
the Napoleonic wars through the American Civil War and World Wars I and II).
During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Exec. Order No. 9066, 7
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however, alternates with the reflection that occurs during
peaceful or stable times. 10 2
A string of cases immediately following World War I
demonstrates the slow but progressive healing process. 10 3 While
upholding the validity of the government's actions, the Court
began to set forth the early principles regarding subversive
political speech. 10 4 A series of concurring opinions by Justices
Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), which gave the Army authority to exclude anyone from areas
it designated as under military control. Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 669. This led
to the internment of more than 110,000 people of Japanese descent. Id.; see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding the Executive
Order).
The mass suspicion regarding Communist affiliations prompted the enactment of
the Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 670-71 (1940) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385); see
Cole, supra note 23, at 6-8. The Smith Act "punished speech" and thus fueled the
McCarthy era's aggressive campaign to punish people for their association with the
Communist Party. Id. at 6-8, n.21; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
507-17 (1951) (upholding convictions under the Smith Act by employing a balancing
test which favored the government).
The Sedition Act, while enacted during peacetime, was a response to the political
turbulence within a young nation. See supra note 100. Although President Jefferson
pardoned all those convicted under both the Alien and Sedition Acts, the acts
themselves, generally regarded now as unconstitutional, were never tested in the
Supreme Court. See Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 668; see supra note 100
(mentioning Lincoln's suspension of the Writ of Habeas corpus).
102 See Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 670-71. "Though the Supreme Court
initially approved most federal actions in support of the war, over the next half-
century, the Court overruled every one of its World War I decisions, effectively
repudiating the excess of that war-time era." Id. at 668-69; see, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Though I doubt if the 'clear
and present danger' test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of a declared
war, I am certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace.").
Among the outmoded World War I decisions are Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
"In 1988, President Ronald Reagan offered an official presidential apology and
reparations to each of the Japanese-American internees." Rosenzweig, supra note
11, at 669; see also Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903,
903-04 (1988) (declaring Congress's apology "on behalf of the Nation" for the "grave
injustice" of interning Japanese-Americans during World War II).
103 See infra notes 104-05.
104 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (containing the first pronouncement of Justice
Holmes's "clear and present danger" test). Holmes said:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Id. Stating that "the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done," id., Justice Holmes explained that the First Amendment would not
protect someone who falsely shouts "fire" in a theatre. Id.
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Holmes and Brandeis sketched many of the ideas that continue
to underlie the modern Court's rationale for the protection of free
speech.105
A few decades after the initial First Amendment cases, the
Court dabbled with a balancing test which allowed for greater
consideration of government interests 106 before moving toward
the bright line approach ultimately adopted in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.10 7 While some Justices pushed for an absolutist approach
to free speech,108 the Court settled more comfortably into a
categorical vision of free speech protections. The Brandenburg
test set forth specific criteria the government was required to
meet before it could proscribe speech. 0 9  Over time, this
approach carved certain categorical exceptions to free speech
protections. 10 On the whole, however, the consideration of the
fundamental societal benefits of free speech remains at the heart
105 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). The majority and concurring opinions in Whitney offered separate
glimpses of what was to come. In upholding a conviction for conspiring to overthrow
the government, the majority inferred specific intent from Whitney's membership in
the Communist Party, thus presaging the guilt by association rationale of the
McCarthy era. See id. at 367-68. By contrast, Justice Brandeis's concurrence, in
which Justice Holmes joined, foreshadowed many of the modern rationales for free
speech protection. See id. at 373-78; see infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
106 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507-17, 577-78 (upholding convictions under the
Smith Act by employing a balancing test that favored the government); see also
supra note 101.
107 395 U.S. at 447. The Court stated the principle as follows:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. The Court in Brandenburg expressly overruled Whitney. Id. at 449.
108 See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579-81 (Black, J., dissenting) (advocating a
literal interpretation of the First Amendment). "I have always believed that the
First Amendment is the keystone of our Government, that the freedoms it
guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all freedom." Id. at 580.
109 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. The requirements of Brandenburg are as
follows: 1) the speech must be incitement; 2) the speech must be objectively likely to
produce imminent lawless action; and 3) the speaker needs to have subjectively
intended to produce such imminent lawless action. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 368 (2d ed. 1999); see also supra note 107.
110 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (observing that incitement is exempt from
First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (fighting words); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (limited protection for libel
against public official).
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of First Amendment jurisprudence."' The modern rationales for
free speech fall loosely into several categories' 12: individual self-
fulfillment; 1" 3 the pursuit of knowledge and truth;" 4 the
participation in the democratic process essential to self-
governance; 15 political dissent to effectuate social change;" 6 and
the practical effect of dissent as a safety-valve to diffuse societal
tension." 7  It is with reference to these basic free speech
rationales that First Amendment limits are based. 118
Modern courts employ the doctrines of overbreadth and void-
for-vagueness to analyze whether legislation adversely affects
First Amendment rights. 1 9 The doctrine of overbreadth concerns
the impermissible encroachment on protected speech that may be
incidental to the legitimate exercise of government regulation. 20
1-, See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 192.
112 See id. at 192-99; REDLICH, supra note 109, at 365 (describing the rationales
by scholars Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson); see also THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter EMERSON,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) [hereinafter EMERSON, GENERAL
THEORY].
113 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 193. The inclusion in the
Declaration of Independence of the unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness
evidences the importance of this principle to our society. See id.
114 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market .. "); see also Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1,
at 194-97.
115 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 197 ("If the legitimate authority of
the government comes only from the consent of the governed, then it is important, in
order for the government to possess legitimate authority, for those granting their
consent to be reasonably well informed.") (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948)). Scordato and Monopoli list the institutional media as a
separate rationale for free speech, but consider it "primarily an extension of the self-
governance rationale." See id. at 198.
116 REDLICH, supra note 109, at 504; see also EMERSON, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, supra note 112, at 6-7.
117 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[T]he path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies[.]"); Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 199 (describing
the cathartic effect of free speech, which in turn avoids the social unrest that would
otherwise accompany repressed grievances); see also REDLICH, supra note 109, at
503 (suggesting that freedom of speech actually constitutes a conservative notion
because it fosters gradual societal change and helps to prevent revolution).
118 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 192.
119 See infra notes 120, 122.
120 See REDLICH, supra note 109, at 511.
When a law reaches both protected and unprotected speech, the Court is
concerned about the potential chilling effect the law might have on those
[Vol. 80:655
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This encroachment produces a chilling effect. 121 The void-for-
vagueness doctrine has its roots in due process jurisprudence and
involves the evaluation of whether a criminal statute is drafted
to give citizens adequate notice of the illegality. 122 The courts
dealing with cases arising under the Patriot Act have faced
challenges arguing both of these claims. 123 Thus far, the courts
have been more amenable to the vagueness argument 124 than the
overbreadth argument,125  or the oft-argued violation of
associational rights.' 26 But, of course, all of these determinations
depend on the particular provision in question.
B. Free Speech and the Internet
"[Tihe Supreme Court has been careful and vigilant in
protecting free speech on the Internet."'127 The series of cases
where the Court sustained online free speech protections against
so compelling a governmental interest as the protection of
who wish to engage in protected speech. When a law is overbroad, the
Court strikes down the entire law, even though the person challenging the
law may have engaged in speech that is constitutionally unprotected.
Id. "The doctrine requires that an entire statute be invalidated because of its chilling
effect on protected speech." Id. at 524.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has allowed for the regulation of
constitutionally protected speech if the regulation meets the strict scrutiny test, i.e.,
if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. See Eugene Volokh,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1132 (2005). In examining the
cases involving laws aimed at shielding children from sexually explicit material, see,
e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989),
Volokh explores the application of strict scrutiny to "dual-use speech," explaining
that material that is sexually explicit but not obscene can be lawfully used by adults
but unlawfully distributed to children. Volokh, supra, at 1133. The Court has held
that restricting all such distribution to adults to prevent the distribution to children
would be "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig." Id. at 1133 (citing Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
121 See supra note 120.
122 See REDLICH, supra note 109, at 512 ("Laws are vague when individuals are
unable to tell whether their conduct is legal or illegal.").
123 See supra notes 28-29.
124 See supra note 28.
125 See supra note 29. The Ninth Circuit has rejected claims that certain
provisions of the Patriot Act regarding material support are overbroad. See id. But
see Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding
unconstitutionally broad the non-disclosure provision of Section 2709).
126 See supra note 30.
127 Peter K. Yu, New Technology and the Supreme Court: How Movie Censorship
in the Early Twentieth Century Sheds Light on Contemporary Issues of Free Speech
on the Internet, FINDLAW, May 23, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
20020523_yu.html.
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children manifests the Court's deference to free expression in
cyberspace. 128 Recently, the Supreme Court sought to compel the
government to explore alternative technologies as a means to
further the government interest rather than rely on legislation
that would impermissibly chill protected speech as an incidence
to its enforcement. 129  In justifying its protective disposition
toward cyberspace, the Court has distinguished the Internet from
traditional broadcast media.1 30  The characteristics of the
Internet, however, continue to change; the challenge thus lies in
developing sound principles to fit a medium where the
constituent properties rapidly continue to evolve.
Online speech generally is protected by the First
Amendment to the same extent as speech in newspapers or
magazines.131  Legislatures have wide latitude, however, to
discriminate among various media-because such discrimination
is based on the medium and is thus content-neutral-when
drafting statutory media rights and privileges. 132 This leaves
open, for example, the question regarding the extent to which
those who publish on the Internet can consider themselves
128 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-67 (2004) (upholding a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA")
since online filtering technology may be a viable alternative to protect children
without COPA's chilling effect on protected speech); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (holding unconstitutionally overbroad provisions
of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA") that related to "virtual"
child pornography, which appeared to depict minors but were not produced using
minors); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") which was enacted to protect children
from "indecent" and "patently offensive" Internet content).
129 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 660-61 (involving the protection of
children).
130 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867 (noting that broadcasters historically
have "received the most limited First Amendment protection" because of the
inability of warnings to "adequately protect the listener from unexpected program
content").
131 Eugene Volokh, The Future of Internet Speech, TCS DAILY, Dec. 5, 2002,
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=120502B.
132 See id.; see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (concluding
that a state sales tax exemption for print media but not cable television is content-
neutral and does not violate the First Amendment). States have differed in their
approach to reconciling the advent of the Internet with statutes related to
traditional media. Compare Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 384-85 (Ga. 2002)
(holding that a state retraction statute applies to Internet speech in addition to
newspapers or other publications), with It's in the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535
N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a state retraction statute that
protected periodicals did not apply to posts on Internet chatrooms).
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"journalists" for the purpose of invoking the privileges
customarily granted to that profession.133 As "bloggers 134
continue to log on in droves-and as their influence and value
continue to be recognized 135-the boundaries of such privileges
remain nebulous. Thus, it seems the fundamental status
distinction that has granted the press considerable protection in
our society cannot be easily translated to apply within
cyberspace. The challenge here lies in applying the rights and
privileges appurtenant to the status of a person when the
distributive nature of the source of online content makes it
difficult to classify the persons providing that content.136
Regardless of any ability to claim special press privileges,
publishers of online content are still entitled to fundamental free
speech protections. 37
While considering speech within the context of cyberspace,
the definition of speech itself warrants discussion. Traditionally,
political justifications have served as the strongest basis for
protecting speech. 138 Several courts, however, have upheld the
notion that computer code itself constitutes protected free
speech. 139 Of course, the Supreme Court has long recognized the
133 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 1, at 198-99 (discussing the special
constitutional status granted to the institutional media).
134 A blogger is someone who maintains an online journal. See Jennifer 8. Lee,
Year of the Blog? Web Diarists Are Now Official Members of Convention Press Corps,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at P7.
135 See id. (describing how bloggers obtained press credentials to cover the 2004
presidential conventions); see also Matthew Klam, Fear and Laptops on the
Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 43 passim
(documenting the increasing influence of blogs in presidential campaigns).
136 See Jonathan Band, Congress Unknowingly Undermines Cyber-Security,
MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), available at http://www.policybandwidth.comdoc/
JBand-IPCyberSecurity.pdf (describing unintended chilling effect caused by
attempts to categorize hackers in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")).
137 See supra notes 127-31.
138 See Volokh, supra note 120, at 1150-51 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
466-67 (1980) (recognizing speech concerning public issues as being on the "highest
rung" of constitutional protection)); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the rationales of protecting speech).
139 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (declaring that
computer source code was protected speech, but that its regulation would
nevertheless depend upon balancing the national security interest in preventing the
exportation of encryption software with the interests of protected speech). The
Junger court distinguished between the expressive and functional features of source
code, but concluded that constitutional protection should not be precluded because a
medium of expression has a functional capacity. See id. at 484; cf. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the computer
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notion that "'all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance,' including those concerning 'the advancement of
truth, science, morality, and arts' have the full protection of the
First Amendment." 140 Computer code, however, serves a broader
purpose than the mere conveyance of ideas; not only does code
have substantial value as a language for communicating ideas,141
but in the aggregate it composes the framework of the Internet,
serving as its rivets and I-beams. It also acts as the law of
cyberspace. 142 As such, computer code falls within the category of
multi-purpose speech, warranting strict scrutiny by courts. 143
Although a prior restraint on the publication of scientific
speech has been upheld in lower federal courts on the ground of
national security, the Supreme Court has never decided a case in
which the issue was the constitutionality of suppressing scientific
speech. 144 This leaves open the possibility that when the Court
does confront this issue, it may be "facing a case where the
government's argument for suppression will be hard for the
Justices to resist."'145 This is especially true considering that
''some scientific speech is now capable of facilitating some
extremely serious harms."146
While many of the cases that relate to the Internet are a
testament to the modern Supreme Court's strong protection of
code was protected speech, but that the non-speech functional aspect of availing the
code to accomplish the unauthorized and unlawful access to copyright protected
material limited the scope of its First Amendment protection). But see DVD Copy
Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 2003) (determining that although
computer code is protected under the First Amendment, content-neutral injunctions
regulating that speech are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny than content-
based regulation).
140 Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
141 See id. ("[C]omputer source code, though unintelligible to many, is the
preferred method of communication among computer programmers.").
142 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999)
("Code is law.").
143 See Volokh, supra note 120, at 1132.
144 See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 999-1000 (W.D.
Wis. 1979) (enjoining the publication of restricted data within an article on the
hydrogen bomb). The court recognized that such publication fell within the
"extremely narrow recognized area, involving national security, in which a prior
restraint on publication is appropriate," and thus not violative of First Amendment
rights. Id. at 1000; see Volokh, supra note 120, at 1150.
145 Volokh, supra note 120, at 1156. Volokh argues that scientific speech
deserves the robust protection offered to political speech. See id.
146 Id.
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free speech, 147 history demonstrates that the Court has acted
with skepticism toward new technology. 148 "After all, it took the
Court 35 years, two World Wars and a Great Depression
to... extend free speech and free press protections to motion
pictures."'149 In coupling this perspective of thin protection with
the current war on terror, one has to consider that free speech
protection on the Internet may be quite fragile. 150
III. ANALYSIS: THE DELIBERATIVE FRAMEWORK NECESSARY TO
EXAMINE THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT LAW ENFORCEMENT
LEGISLATION MAY HAVE ON THE INTERNET
A. A Time for Response; A Time for Deliberation
In rapid response to the events of September 11, 2001,
Congress enacted the Patriot Act just over a month after the
terrorist attacks.1 51 Acting pursuant to its unique Constitutional
role,152 Congress established a framework to confront the
terrorist threat that, for the first time, had arrived on United
147 See supra notes 128-30.
148 See Yu, supra note 127.
149 Id.; see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (overruling
Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) and extending free speech
and free press protections to motion pictures). By originally declaring that the
exhibition of motion pictures was conducted purely for profit, the Court, in the
earlier case, had distinguished motion pictures from the other mediums of
expression that had free speech protections. See Yu, supra note 127.
150 See Yu, supra note 127 (claiming that we should not take the Court's
decisions protecting speech on the Internet for granted). "When Ashcroft v. ACLU
returns to the Court-after the federal court of appeals has ruled on the questions
the Supreme Court wisely refused to answer prematurely-the Supreme Court may
be more reluctant to protect the right of free speech on the Internet." Id.; see Sanford
Levinson, What Is the Constitution's Role in Wartime?: Why Free Speech and Other
Rights Are Not As Safe As You Might Think, FINDLAw, Oct. 17, 2001,
http://writ.news.findlaw.comcommentary/20011017_levinson.html ("[A]lt bets are off
with regard to the courts offering genuine protection of civil liberties during time of
war.").
151 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
152 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 99, at 362. The United States
Constitution contains no "state of emergency" exception allowing for its suspension.
Id. Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution similarly suggests that the Executive is to be
looked to only when the Legislature cannot be convened. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4. One only need look to the Weimar Constitution of 1919, which allowed Hitler to
seize upon the emergency provisions that granted the executive nearly unlimited
power in times of crisis, to see that alternative approaches allowing either for
constitutional suspension or for broad executive action do not fit in with our concept
of separation of powers. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 99, at 363.
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States soil. Congress, therefore, took appropriate action to
ensure the protection of America and the safety of its citizens.
The separation of powers principle embedded in the
Constitution-and which remains essential to our liberty-
implicitly requires that the legislative branch take prompt action
to mobilize the government against threats that not only
challenge the institutions of government, but endanger the
sovereignty of the people. 153 After the dust settles, however, our
elected representative body should exercise the reciprocal duty-
attendant to its obligation to act decisively to defend the country
and citizens-to undertake the deliberative process fundamental
to representative government. To hedge its bold response,
Congress responsibly enacted a sunset provision, granting the
members time to consider whether these laws should become
permanent. 154
As already posited, encroachment on free speech incidental
to law enforcement may have a destructive effect where the
Internet is concerned.1 55 The courts have not yet forged firm
First Amendment principles for the Internet, rendering it a
distinct possibility that such destructive effects may occur. 156
Proper deliberation-with a thorough understanding and honest
assessment of the potential costs to the Internet and society in
general-is necessary to determine whether society considers a
margin of destruction to cyberspace an acceptable price for
security.
B. Ostensibly Under the Banner of Terrorism: Legislation That
Transcends the Antiterrorism Purpose
It is necessary to distinguish between "law enforcement"
legislation and "antiterrorism" legislation. Determining whether
a particular provision serves antiterrorism goals is central to any
debate regarding whether to sustain, truncate, or expand the
Patriot Act or similar initiatives. The actual purpose of
legislation, however, may be broader than antiterrorism
153 The separation of powers principle seeks to prevent the executive branch
from usurping power even during crisis. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 99,
at 360. The alternative to decisive legislative action likely would be demand for
executive action, which would risk violating our fundamental system of government.
See supra note 152.
154 See supra notes 43, 53, 63 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 150.
[Vol. 80:655
BEYOND TERRORISM
objectives, with the government seeking to augment its general
power to prosecute. 157 Because the Department of Justice has
shown a desire to include activities beyond the scope of
terrorism, 158 it suffices to describe such potential legislation as
"law enforcement" legislation.
There are provisions currently within the Patriot Act that do
not relate directly to combating terrorism. 159 The stated purpose
of the Act is "[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United
States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes."'160 On its face, this
statement appears clear in asserting that the legislation is
intended to broaden law enforcement authority and to leave open
the possibility for "other purposes."'161 But in considering the
exigencies surrounding its hurried enactment, it seems more
likely that the impetus to confront terrorism took precedent over
ensuring proper analysis to determine whether each provision
could be justified to the citizenry whose liberties were at stake.
In its haste, Congress packed provisions into the Patriot Act
that had been undergoing extensive debate, independent of any
overarching terrorist purpose, before September 11.162 Congress
did not have time to ensure that the legislation abridging civil
liberties was drafted narrowly.163 The courts, by applying strict
scrutiny, have begun to determine that some provisions fail the
test that a law be sufficiently narrow to serve a compelling
government interest 164  Lawmakers themselves have also
introduced proposals to curtail those provisions unjustifiably
adverse to civil liberties, evidencing a desire to reopen some of
the debates which had been ongoing before the enactment of the
157 See, e.g., supra note 38.
158 See supra Part I.B.2.
159 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 202, 115 Stat. 272, 278
(2001); see also supra note 38.
160 See USA PATRIOT Act.
161 See id.
162 John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, HUM.
RTS., Winter 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter02/podesta.html
('2Many of the electronic surveillance provisions in the Patriot Act faced serious
opposition prior to September 11 from a coalition of privacy advocates, computer
users, and elements of high-tech industry.").
163 See supra text accompanying note 120.
164 See, e.g., Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (declaring
that the non-disclosure provision of Section 505 of the Patriot Act is not sufficiently
narrow); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Patriot Act. 165 These debates would necessarily take on a distinct
post-9/11 perspective, but would be debates nonetheless.
Within its proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act,
the Justice Department included provisions that would grant it
even broader authority. 166 It may be debated whether these
proposals would only incidentally serve the fight against
terrorism and whether such ancillary benefits justify the
abridgement of civil liberties. But as the title of the draft
suggests-Domestic Security Enhancement Act-the aggregate
of these proposals transcends any purported antiterrorism
purpose. Included are provisions having nothing to do with
terrorism. 167 Some lawmakers expressly criticized this absence of
a relationship with terrorism.168 Once again, close scrutiny must
be applied during legislative deliberation to each provision and
its potential ramifications.
The computer fraud provisions within the Patriot Act 169 and
the encryption provisions among the new proposals 170 serve as
two concrete examples that affect the computer industry yet have
no primary focus toward stemming terrorism. Of course, that is
not to say that such provisions would never provide any benefit
to the cause of fighting terrorism. But, pursuant to the principle
that legislation which abridges civil liberties be drafted
narrowly, 171 such speculation of potential achievement cannot
pass muster. While either provision may provide effective law
enforcement in its own right, to strike an honest balance between
proper government activity and improper infringement on rights,
it is crucial to separate such provisions from those laws with the
direct goal of combating terrorism.
C. On the Effects of Prosecuting Online Service Providers
A new government strategy to pursue terrorist activity on
165 See supra notes 68-79.
166 See SECURITY ACT, supra note 84 passim.
167 See id. §§ 105 ("Law Enforcement Use of FISA Information"), 404 ("Use of
Encryption to Conceal Criminal Activity"); supra note 84; see also supra notes 92, 97
and accompanying text.
168 See H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. § 2(4) (2003); see also supra text accompanying
note 87.
169 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 202, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001);
see also supra note 38.
170 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 120.
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the Internet targets hosting websites, despite the fact that the
host is not necessarily the author of the content. 72 Prosecutors
charge that administrators of websites should be held criminally
liable for what appears on their sites. 173  To this end, the
government seeks to exploit the "expert advice or assistance"
definition within the material support provision of the Patriot
Act. 174  Other law enforcement initiatives have legitimately
thwarted the ability of terrorists to use the Internet, such as the
government's campaign against the financial support of
terrorists.' 75 The financial support campaign, however, can be
distinguished from the "expert advice or assistance" initiative
because it is limited to targeting financial support services-
comprising only a fraction of total Internet activity-using
specific regulations. 76  A campaign against website
administrators, however, threatens to affect the functionality of
the Internet itself and signals a heightened risk of chilling
Internet activity. 177
Both the courts and Congress have generally limited liability
for online providers of access, transmission, or other services.
178
In the context of defamation, the online web provider is shielded
from liability for its hosted content much like a bookstore is
shielded from defamatory content in books. 79 To further protect
providers of online services, Congress essentially severed an
online service provider ("OSP") from an information content
provider for the purpose of limiting OSP liability for failure to
block offensive material. 80 Although the law does not extend to
172 See Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Online and Even Near Home, a New Front
Is Opening in the Global Terror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A12.
173 Id.
174 See id.; see also USA PATRIOT Act § 805; supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
175 See generally Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism:
Curbing Terrorist Use of the Internet, 5 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 5 (2004)
(describing the campaign against internet-facilitated financial support of terrorism).
176 See id.
177 See Band, supra note 136.
178 See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
179 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y 1991)
(holding that the defendant provider had no liability for defamatory statements in
its electronically available service).
180 See Communications Decency Act § 230 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230). The
portion which severs liability states that "[n]o provider.., of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider." Id. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute
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criminal prosecutions, it reveals a commitment to keep sources of
content and providers of services separate.' 8 ' The important
contribution of such services to the free flow of information
corresponds with the free speech rationale expressed by Justice
Holmes as a marketplace of ideas. 8 2 Requiring web hosting
companies to review all their data and transmissions poses a
significant risk to the entire distribution scheme. 8 3 Considering
the reliance on individual private initiative to sustain the upkeep
of the decentralized network architecture of the Internet, the
distinction between content and service providers supported by
the legislation seems crucial to prevent the chill resulting from
private over-regulation that would likely accompany such a fear
of prosecution. 184
Some courts have recognized already the problems inherent
in legislation that criminalizes by broad strokes, declaring the
"expert advice and assistance" provision unconstitutionally
vague. 8 5 Other courts have expressly refused to find it either
overbroad or a violation of associational speech. 8 6 This is not,
defines "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to
the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions." Id. § 230(f)(2). The statute further defines "information
content provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3).
181 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., No. 00-CV-71544-DT,
2001 WL 1176319 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2001) (trademark infringement).
182 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 114.
183 This distributor exception is not an idea that is new or unique to the
Internet. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the
distributor exception to magazine distribution company).
184 Scordato and Monopoli describe the post-9/11 private reaction to publishers'
and network executives' popular perception that the majority of Americans believe
that speech critical of the government should be suppressed. See Scordato &
Monopoli, supra note 1, at 188. The private censorship resulting from television
networks' fear of negative public reaction is analogous to the over-regulation that
would arise from fear by OSPs of criminal sanctions. Id.
185 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D.
Cal. 2005). Courts have similarly found other provisions unconstitutionally vague.
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1137-38 (holding that the terms
"training" and "personnel" are unconstitutionally vague); Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at
356-61 (dismissing the counts of the indictment based on the vagueness of the terms
"communications equipment" and "personnel"); see also supra note 28.
186 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201-
02 (C.D. Cal. 2004); see also supra notes 29-30.
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however, the first time recent legislation was alleged to have a
chilling effect online.18 7 Many critics of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") 88 assert that there was a chilling effect
imposed on legitimate computer security research by the
provision that prohibits the circumvention of copyright protection
technology.18 9 It is conceivable that the "expert advice and
assistance" provision will chill both content providers and service
providers. While content providers, as speakers, may be afforded
less protection in instances that fall under traditional free speech
exceptions, 90 service providers may find themselves in the
precarious situation of not being able to examine or comprehend
feasibly all the messages that are stored in their extensive digital
domains.
D. Construing the Mens Rea Requirement of the Material
Support Provision
Considering that the material support provision seems to be
the workhorse statute of the government in its campaign against
terror and that it is being considered for aggressive new
initiatives, it is necessary to examine how courts thus far have
interpreted the statute. Section 2339B of title 18 of the United
States Code-established by the AEDPA and modified by the
Patriot Act-reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 191
Congress again amended the material support provision in 2004,
declaring that to violate the provision, "a person must have
knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
187 See Jonathan Band, supra note 136 (describing the chilling effect caused by
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
188 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
189 See Band, supra note 136.
190 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1086 (2002) (holding that a website
containing a list of the names of doctors providing abortions with lines drawn
through the names of doctors who had provided abortions and had been killed or
wounded constituted a true threat that is not protected speech).
191 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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organization..., that the organization has engaged or engages
in terrorist activity..., or that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorism.' ' 92
Prior to the 2004 amendment, the Florida District Court, in
United States v. Al-Arian, construed the statute to require a
mens rea of specific intent, in an attempt to reach the
appropriate balance between government interests and
individual rights.193  Noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that a scienter or mens rea requirement
may mitigate a law's vagueness,"'194 the court exercised judicial
restraint in interpreting the statute in a manner that avoided the
constitutional challenge. 195 The court essentially rescued the
statute from being declared unconstitutionally vague by
requiring a specific intent to further the illegal activities of an
FTO.196  In the course of doing so, the court expressly
disapproved of the Ninth Circuit's determination that the statute
is unconstitutionally vague. 197
The Ninth Circuit, in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,
192 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638, 3762-63 (2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
193 See United States v. Al-Arian ("Al-Arian If'), 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296
(M.D. Fla. 2004). The court held that the statute required the government to "prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that: (a) the organization was a
FTO or had committed unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated; and (b)
what he was furnishing was 'material support[,]'" with the "specific intent ... that
the support would further the illegal activities of the FTO." Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp.
2d 1322, 1338-39 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
The Seventh Circuit similarly held, in the context of civil liability for violation of
§ 2339B, that the plaintiff must prove the defendant knew about the unlawful
activities of the FTO and intended to assist in those activities. See Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1023-25 (7th
Cir. 2002). In defending its construction of § 2339B, the Florida District Court in Al-
Arian I cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Boim, concerning civil liability, to
explain the importance of avoiding "the anomaly of civil liability being more narrow
than criminal liability based on the same statutory language." Al-Arian I, 308 F.
Supp. 2d at 1339 n.33.
194 Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 n.32 (citing Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994)).
195 See Al-Arian II, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999)); see also United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (asserting that, as long as it is not contrary to the
intent of Congress, a statute should be interpreted in a manner that avoids
constitutional problems).
196 See supra note 193.
197 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1138 n.5 (9th Cir.
2000).
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originally construed § 2339B, as requiring "knowingly" to modify
only "provides."198 This meant that the scienter requirement was
met when the accused had knowledge that he provided
something, rather than knowledge that he was providing
"material support."199  The court in Al-Arian discussed the
potential for absurdity resulting from this interpretation. 20 0 For
example, "a donor could be convicted for giving money to a FTO
without knowledge that an organization was a FTO or that it
committed unlawful activities, and without an intent that the
money be used to commit future unlawful activities. 20 1
"Similarly, a bank teller who cashes the donor's check for a FTO
could also be guilty despite a similar lack of knowledge. 20 2
A few years later, in Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft,
the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its construction of the mens rea
requirement and concluded that § 2339B also required that the
accused either 1) know that the organization was an FTO, or 2)
know of the organization's unlawful activities that caused it to be
designated an FTO.20 The court ended up reaffirming its prior
vagueness finding without accounting for any changes brought by
the new mens rea requirement. 20 4 The court in Al-Arian rejected
this construction as well, citing with disapproval the potentially
odd results still remaining with this expanded construction. 20 5
For example, as construed by the Ninth Circuit:
[A] cab driver could be guilty for giving a ride to a FTO member
to the U[nited] N[ations], if he knows that the person is a
member of a FTO or the member or his organization at
sometime conducted an unlawful activity in a foreign country.
Similarly, a hotel clerk in New York could be committing a
198 AI-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno, 205 F.3d at 1138 n.5).
199 Id. (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that "a purely grammatical reading of
the plain language of Section 2339B(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to
knowingly furnish any item contained in the material support categories to an
organization that has been designated a FTO").
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1337 n.28.
203 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382, 400 (9th Cir. 2003).
204 Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d at 403-05).
205 Id. at 1337-38.
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crime by providing lodging to that same FTO member under
similar circumstances as the cab driver. 20 6
The court in Al-Arian concluded that it was more consistent with
Congress's intent to imply a mens rea requirement to the
material support provision.20 7  The court said that this
construction not only avoids the constitutional vagueness
problem, but also comports with the Supreme Court's prior
holding that a mens rea requirement should apply to each of the
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct. 208 In a later order within the same case, the court
rejected the argument that the expanded scienter requirement
would hamper the government's antiterrorism campaign,
asserting that the requisite intent can easily be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. 20 9
The Florida District Court, however, seems to stand alone in
its construction of § 2339B. Most recently, a New York District
Court rejected a defendant's contention that the government
must prove that he acted with specific intent to further the illegal
activities of the foreign terrorist organization, stating that such a
conclusion "departs from the majority of existing authority."210
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress dispensed
with any specific intent requirement in its 2004 amendment of
the material support provision. 211  The Northern District of
Illinois, too, has disputed the additional requirement of a finding
that a defendant specifically intended to further terrorist
activities, stating:
[T]he additional requirement finds no basis in the statute's
language. Moreover, such a reading clashes with Congress's
intent. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, in enacting the
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1338.
208 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
209 United States v. AI-Arian (Al-Arian I), 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) ("This [cjourt reiterates that it is in no way creating a safe harbor for
terrorists or their supporters .... Instead, [it] is attempting to construe Section
2339B(a)(1) in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmity.").
210 United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006) (acknowledging that the Second Circuit has not yet
addressed the issue).
211 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) ("This [c]ourt must assume that Congress, with full awareness of [the Al-
Arian and Humanitarian Law Project] decisions, incorporated the [Ninth Circuit's]
holding into the statute and rejected the Al-Arian ruling requiring specific intent.").
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AEDPA, []Congress determined that foreign organizations that
engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct. 2 1
2
Most of these cases, however, primarily deal with material
support other than "expert advice or assistance," usually
comprising some form of financial support. Notwithstanding its
rejection of a specific intent requirement, the Ninth Circuit has
consistently held the "expert advice or assistance" provision to be
unconstitutionally vague. 213 Congress attempted to clarify the
meaning of "expert advice or assistance" by defining it as
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 214  The
Ninth Circuit, however, found this definition lacking, stating that
"the 'specialized knowledge' portion of this definition is vague
because it merely repeats what an expert is and provides no
additional clarity."215  Thus, the questions remain: will other
courts declare the "expert advice and assistance" provision
unconstitutionally vague, and may a more stringent specific
intent requirement be required to save this portion of the
statute?
Applying the Al-Arian mens rea construction in the "expert
advice or assistance" context seemingly mitigates the risk of a
cyber chilling effect resulting from what has become the
government's primary tool for pursuing terrorism, at least in
terms of OSPs.216 Many internet sites hosting militant Islamic
message boards are run on computer servers within the United
States.21 7  Requiring providers of online services to have a
specific intention to further the illegal activities of an FTO would
likely eliminate much of the fear by OSPs that liability may lie in
some sector of their technology sphere. Without a requirement of
specific intent, an OSP faces the insurmountable chore of
ensuring that it is not unwittingly hosting a website that may be
providing material support to terrorists.218 Furthermore, the
212 United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(citation omitted).
213 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
214 Id. at 1151.
215 Id.
216 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
217 See Lipton & Lichtblau, supra note 172.
218 This is especially true considering the vast size of the hosting architecture
within many of the larger companies and the manpower necessary to parse stored
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language difference invites the targeting of Muslim websites, a
discriminatory activity that itself would compromise important
Constitutional rights.219
By requiring specific intent, the Florida District Court
rescued-at least within its jurisdiction-a statute that may
legitimately aid the government in pursuing terrorists. 220 As it
asserted, the government would not be hampered in its campaign
against terrorism since specific intent can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. 221 Courts in two important centers of
the computer industry, California and New York, have already
declared portions of the material support provision
unconstitutionally vague. 222 Requiring specific intent, at least in
instances where "expert advice and assistance" is at issue, may
be a viable solution that both sustains the government's ability to
prosecute those who aid terrorists and avoids an overly broad
enforcement sweep that risks chilling OSPs from performing
their crucial role of hosting on the Internet. As more courts
confront the "expert advice or assistance" provision, particularly
in the technological arena, they should consider following the
lead of the Florida District Court and read in the requirement of
specific intent.
E. The Incentive to Delete Information to Avoid Liability
The danger of private censorship is easily imaginable in the
OSP context, as web hosting companies may preemptively pull
down material from which they fear liability.223 Similarly, the
implementation by OSPs of business policies to avoid liability
information and to monitor activity. Moreover, much of the server space, in which
data and websites are stored, is sold to clients who then resell it to their customers.
Id.
219 See id. (reporting the charge that concentrating on Islamic websites while
ignoring domestically produced anarchist manuals available on the internet
amounts to an anti-Muslim campaign).
220 See Al-Arian II, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("By this Court
resolving those constitutional concerns in the manner that it did, this Court avoided
doing grievous harm to Section 2339B by declaring all or parts of it
unconstitutional.").
221 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (C.D.
Cal. 2004); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
223 See supra note 184 (describing private, as opposed to government, self-
regulation).
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may adversely affect the free flow of information. 224 In August,
2004, the Electronic Frontier Foundation compiled a best-
practices list for online service providers ("OSPs") 225 wherein it
recommended that OSPs set policies to minimize data retention
to limit their liability risks, avoid the high cost of having to
search through all their data upon the receipt of a subpoena, and
protect the privacy of their users. 226 Essentially, this requires
the deletion of all data not deemed necessary for their service.
227
The irony here is that the expanded law enforcement
authority granted by the Patriot Act motivated such
recommendations. 228  But if OSPs follow these
recommendations-which they have great incentive to do
considering the risks of liability and excess costs-then there will
be a significantly diminished data trail and thus no data for the
government to seize pursuant to its increased authority. 229 This
means that when the urgent need for information legitimate to a
pressing terrorist or national security matter arises, there may
be no such information on record. Under those circumstances,
there would indeed be a law enforcement chill.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is a relatively new medium of communications,
and its networked, decentralized nature makes it difficult to
define its properties. Thus, regulation of this medium-which
relies on its users to construct the architecture, provide the
content, and organically improve the state-of-the-art-is tricky
and potentially destructive. The deliberative process envisioned
by the Founding Fathers affords the best opportunity to prevent
overly broad legislation from riding society's fear of terrorism
into constitutional territory-an area which typically requires
compelling reasons for the abridgment of fundamental rights.
Broad legislation that ostensibly comports with the goal of
combating terrorism reflects the fear of a nation determined to do
224 See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, BEST DATA PRACTICES FOR ONLINE
SERVICE PROVIDERS 1-3 (2004), http://www.eff.org/osp/20040819_OSPBest
Practices.pdf (recommending that companies implement business policies that would
limit the amount of data they store in order to avoid liability).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 See id.
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whatever it takes to stop the next terrorist attack. Yet portions
of such legislation may have minimal benefit in countering
terrorism while having deleterious effects on fundamental rights.
The terrorist threat will likely plague society well into the
future. As the war on terrorism perseveres, the stark realities of
an enduring conflict demand, for the sake of preserving liberty,
that lawmakers employ the discipline necessary to scrutinize the
benefits and costs of each grant of authority that may abridge
constitutionally protected liberties. A necessary component of
such examination is the consideration of the effects such laws
may have on the Internet. The Internet is dependent upon the
unbridled exchange of ideas. Ignoring this reliance may hinder
the development of the Internet, which will ultimately be to the
detriment of this nation. As progress has always been this
nation's credo, freedom has been its engine. And freedom of
thought and speech is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom."230 While deciding whether
to limit the protections of free speech, we must give thorough
consideration to the cost of a chill over the Internet.
230 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (quoting Justice Cardozo).
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